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ABsTrACT
This paper examines the perception of bankers on contribution of 
audit committees towards external auditor independence in public 
listed companies. All Malaysian public listed companies are required 
to establish an audit committee as a measure to improve on the internal 
control mechanism that can help improve the corporate governance 
practices of firms.  Postal questionnaires and interview surveys were 
used to solicit the perception and views of loan officers. The majority 
of the respondents believe that auditor independence is preserved with 
the presence of an actively functioning audit committee. This implies 
favourably on the corporate governance reforms initiated by the 
government after the 1998 financial crisis.
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InTroduCTIon
Over the last decade, various regulatory agencies and interest groups had been 
actively promoting the idea of an effective audit committee in all public listed 
companies, in the interest strengthen the corporate governance practices.  The 
establishment of audit committee is perceived to improve the financial aspects 
of corporate governance.  Indeed, the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(MCCG) postulates that “an independent audit committee serves to implement and 
support the oversight function of the board in several ways”1 (MCCG 2001, p. 38). 
Audit committee is expected to undertake the board of director roles in providing 
* Corresponding author: Email: zms@econ.upm.edu.my.
1 In Malaysia, the MCCG defined independent of directors as “broadly to two crucial aspects - 
independence from management and independence from a significant shareholder” (MCCG 2001, 
p. 25).
Any remaining errors or omissions rest solely with the author(s) of this paper.
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“focused review and detailed discussion of the company’s processes for producing 
financial data, its internal controls, and independence of its external auditor”, which 
it “might be too time-consuming for the full board” (MCCG 2001, p. 36).
However, prior studies on audit committees in the listed firms indicate that these 
committees are ineffective in their expected roles.  Zulkarnain and Shamsher (2007) 
reported that many Malaysian audit committees only act as a ‘rubber stamp’ and 
committees are formed to comply by the new requirement, and the requirement do 
not detail on the various pertinent issues that could justify the establishment of such 
a committee.  Menon and Williams (1994) pointed out that audit committees ‘are 
often created for the purposes of appearances rather than to enhance stockholders’ 
control of management’.  Sommer (1991) argues that the formation of audit 
committee is not a guarantee that they will perform effective oversight duties or 
improve the ineffective financial reporting and auditing practices.  They construed 
with the following statement, ‘there is considerable anecdotal evidence that many, 
if not most, audit committees fall short of doing what are generally perceived as 
being their duties’.
The objective of this paper is to examine the bankers’ perception or more 
specifically the loan officers perceptions on the impact of audit committee (i.e. 
meeting, report, role to approve audit fees, role to review audit fees, composition) 
on auditor independence.  It may be that the presence of audit committee could 
reduce the impending management threat to auditor independence because the 
majority of the audit committee members are independent and non-executive that 
cannot be easily influenced by management.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  The next section outlines 
the relevant literature and the third section describes the research methodology. 
The results of the study are reported in the fourth section, while the final section 
concludes the paper.
LITerATure revIew
Consistent with global trends, the Bursa Malaysia (previously known as the Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange) has made it mandatory for all Malaysian public listed 
companies to have audit committee with effect from 1994.  Seven years after the call 
to establish audit committee, the Malaysian government established the Malaysian 
Code of Corporate governance to ensure high quality of corporate governance 
practices, consistent with the efforts to globalize its financial markets.  Among 
others, the Code emphasise the important role of audit committees in improving 
the good corporate governance practices.
The effort to improve corporate governance practices in Malaysian capital 
market has been undertaken by the Securities Commission (SC) as early as 1996 
in a three-phased shift towards disclosure-based regulation (DBR).  During Phase 
1 (1996-1999: Flexible/Hybrid MBR), the emphasis was to regulate on disclosure, 
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due diligence and corporate governance.  Phase 2 (January 2000: Partial DBR) 
still focused on corporate disclosure, due diligence and corporate governance, 
but included focus on promotion of accountability and self-regulation.  In Phase 
3 (2001 onwards: Full DBR) the SC enforced high standards of disclosure, due 
diligence and corporate governance as well as exercise of self regulation and 
responsible conduct.
In developed countries, the evolution of audit committee in mid-twentieth 
century, where the committees were established voluntarily indicated it provide 
more effective communication between the external auditors and management 
(Rezaee, 2002).  Indeed, the committee is expected to oversee corporate governance, 
financial reporting, internal control structure, internal audit functions, and external 
audit services (Rezaee et al., 2003).
It is well documented that audit committee could enhance the communication 
network between auditor and management (Fearnley and Beattie, 2004; Goodwin-
Stewart and Kent, 2006; Stewart and Munro, 2007).  In a study participated by 
audit partners, finance directors and financial journalists, Beattie et al. (1999) 
discovered that audit committee that comprise of independent directors could 
strengthen auditor independence.
However, Shamsher et al. (2001) found that a large majority of companies 
listed on the Malaysian stock exchange (Bursa Malaysia) to practice ‘box ticking’ 
culture, where the formation of audit committee is a procedural compliance.  These 
companies established audit committee as a result of rules imposed on them by 
regulator. 
Relevant disclosures about a company’s audit committee, its activities and its 
interaction with the company’s auditors and management could improve investor 
confidence in the process and the overall quality of financial reporting.  For example, 
the requirement to submit audit committee reports with financial statements will 
provide investors with a better understanding of the committee’s oversight role in the 
financial reporting process (Shamsher et al., 2001).  The contents of the committee 
report should include details such as plans and discussions with management and 
external auditors.  However, Shamsher et al. (2001) discovered that large majorities 
of Malaysian audit committees only report their terms of reference (i.e. only what 
they are expected to do) in the audit committee report (ACR) and nothing is reported 
on what they have actually done.
An independent audit committee is crucial to the good governance practices. 
Beasley et al. (2000) discovers the association between companies committing 
financial statement fraud with the incidence of lack of independent audit committee 
members.  Abbott et al. (2003) found that companies that did not commit fraud 
tend to have more independent audit committees than companies committing fraud. 
Indeed, independent directors did not have personal or economic interest in the 
company, and thus are able to put their argument without fear and favour (Beasley 
et al., 2000).  Klein (2002) discovers the extent of annual discretionary accruals is 
320
International Journal of Economics and Management
negatively associated with audit committee independence only when an independent 
committee is defined as one with more than a majority of independent directors.
DeZoort et al. (2003) pointed out that audit committees should be active and 
diligent to discharge their oversight responsibilities.  Literature views the audit 
committee diligence through the frequency of the committee meetings throughout 
the financial year (Song & Windram, 2004; Xie et al., 2003).
Bedard et al. (2004) discovered audit committees that meet more than twice a 
year, have member(s) with financial knowledge (i.e. financial expertise) and consist 
solely of independent directors are associated with less income-increasing earnings 
management (or are more independent).  Xie et al. (2003) discovered the negative 
relationship between audit committee meetings with earnings management.  The 
documented evidence indicates that an active and diligent audit committee adds 
value and help maintain the integrity of the financial reporting process (DeFond 
and Jiambalvo, 1991; Dechow et al., 1996).
MeThodoLogy
The required information in this study was sourced from questionnaire survey and 
personal interviews of loan officers of selected top banks and financial institutions. 
The level of officers interviewed were those users of financial statements and had 
a good understanding of the importance of auditor independence.  The aim of the 
interview survey was to further elaborate the issues raised in the postal survey 
and to investigate the underlying reasons behind the answers given.  Indeed, face-
to-face interviews provide rich data, offer the opportunity to establish rapport 
with the interviewees, and help to explore and understand complex issues like the 
relationship between audit committee and auditor independence.
The questionnaires were pilot-tested to ensure that the relevant questions on the 
research issue of interest were asked in the context of the current level of practices 
to generate a maximum response rate.  The total response rate for this study was 
44%, which is consistent with the average response rate in similar studies in the 
developed markets.  For example, Wallace and Mellor (1998) pointed out that the 
common phenomenon of responses is as low as between 30 to 50%.
Table 1 Analysis of responses by respondent’s category
Category
Total 
Questionnaires 
Issued
usable 
responses 
received 
Pre-reminder
usable 
responses 
received Post-
reminder 1
usable 
responses 
received Post-
reminder 2
Total 
usable 
response
Total usable 
response 
rate
Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency %
Financial 
Institutions 200 32 28 27 87 44
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Majority of the respondents had a working experience of at least 5 years and 
were responsible for the decision making that involve reading and evaluating 
financial statements for loan approval.  The seniority of the respondents provides 
better validity for their responses since it is assumed that they were well-informed 
with the changes in the rules and regulations, well versed with their job functions 
and subsequently keep informed with the changes in the accounting and auditing 
profession.
Table 2 Profile of loan officers analysed by category of employment
status number %
Officer 34 39
Senior Manager 41 47
Chief Executive 12 14
87 100
For the purposes of better understanding of perceptions given by respondents 
from different size of banks, the respondents were classified based on size of 
deposits from customer2.  Responses from loan officers of banks with deposits 
from customers above RM50 million were grouped as Top Tier, those with deposits 
from customers between RM33 million and 50 million were classified as Medium 
Tier and those with deposits from customers below 33 million were treated as Low 
Tier.  The frequencies of responses to the questionnaire distributed are reported 
in Table 3.
Table 3 Analysis showing frequency and criteria of sample partitioned
Banks Criterion deposits from Customers Frequency
Top Tier ≥ 50 Million 25
Medium Tier >33 Million, < 50 Million 25
Low Tier ≤ RM33 Million 37
Total 87
To ensure the reliability and validity of the information gathered, a test was 
done to diagnose the presence of non-response bias.3 To examine the existence of 
2 This procedure was made possible by differentiating the colour of questionnaires cover.  Prior to 
distributing the questionnaire, respective banks’ deposits from customers were gathered and they were 
grouped into the appropriate size classification.
3 The possibility of occurrence of non-response bias arises when some of the survey sample failed to 
return the questionnaire and the data may consequently turn out to be invalid.  It is well recognised in 
the literature that responses to mail questionnaires are generally poor, and it is a common phenomenon 
to see return percentages as low as between 30 to 50% (Wallace and Mellor, 1988, p. 132).
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non-response bias, the first 20 questionnaires received were compared with the 
last 20 questionnaires using the Mann-Whitney test.  It was found that there was 
no significant difference between the 20 early and 20 late responses, implying the 
absence of any significant non-response bias4.
Table 4 Interview survey
Bank number of Loan 
Officers Interviewed
Job description  
of Interviewee size of Bank
experience in 
Function
B1 1 Chief Executive Officer Top Tier 20
B2 1 Manager Low Tier 13
B3 1 Manager Top Tier 8
B4 1 Manager Top Tier 12
B5 2 Director Low Tier 12
Senior Manager Low Tier 16
B6 1 Manager Top Tier 13
B7 1 Chief Executive Officer Low Tier 25
B8 1 Assistant Manager Medium Tier 10
B9 2 Director Medium Tier 20
Executive Medium Tier 5
B10 1 Manager Top Tier 18
B11 1 Manager Low Tier 12
B12 1 Assistant General Manager Low Tier 18
B13 1 Vice President Top Tier 28
B14 2 Chief Executive Officer Low Tier 22
General Manager Low Tier 8
Average of Years of Experience 15.29
The long period of experience of the respondents in Table 4 indicate that 
their opinions as authoritative, and consequently can be generalised to the whole 
population.
resuLTs
Public and regulatory bodies demand for accountability and reform has lead to the 
requirement for establishment of audit committees as the important component of 
corporate governance practices in Malaysian public listed companies.  The Bursa 
4 Another source of bias in survey-type studies is self-selection bias (Eysenbach and Wyatt, 2002; 
Oppenheim, 1992; Whitehead, 1991).  Oppenheim (1992, p.30) termed this phenomenon as ‘volunteer 
bias’.  The bias might arise from the fact that “people are more likely to respond to a questionnaire 
if they see items which interest them” (Eysenbach and Wyatt, 2002) and “they may try to ‘respond’ 
extra-well” (Oppenheim, 1992, p.30) to the questions.  In this study, it was found that self-selection 
bias did not exist.
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Malaysia has taken steps by amending it listing requirements in 2001.  The new 
requirement necessitates audit committee members to independent, vigilant, able to 
manage their enhanced liability and are able perform their delegated responsibilities 
in an effective manner.  The respondents were asked to indicate their views on the 
five relevant issues or required characteristics of a well functioning audit committee. 
The results are tabulated in Panel A and B of Table 5 below and reported in the 
following sections.
Activeness Audit Committee
The frequency of audit committee meetings would be a sign of the amount of effort 
by members of audit committee in delivering their responsibilities.  Menon and 
Williams (1994) pointed out that the common perceptions that audit committees 
will not be effective unless they meet regularly to discuss issues arise (i.e. active). 
The UK’s Smith Report (2003) suggested that the audit committee chairman, in 
discussion with the company secretary, should determine the frequency and timing 
of its meetings.
The information in Table 5 indicates that the majority of the loan officers in 
Top (40%), Medium (28%) and Low (70%) Tier banks agreed with the view that an 
active audit committee would better able to safeguard auditor independence.  The 
responses shown by the majority of the respondents might be a sign of agreement 
with the general perceptions that active audit committees that spend more time 
through having frequent meeting to discuss issues on internal control, risk, corporate 
reporting and any matters arising from business operations would enhance auditor 
independence.  This would be expected to serve as a safeguard for good financial 
reporting.  However, the meetings frequency during a financial year has not always 
been clearly specified in codes and principles.  For example, the amended Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirements did not suggest a minimum number of meetings 
or guideline on the appropriate meetings frequency.
Based on size classification, the loan officers of Low Tier banks seems to exhibit 
higher agreement that active audit committee could support auditor independence. 
The perception stem from the fact that the Top and Medium Tier banks might be 
already dealing with larger and establish corporate client that are practising good 
corporate governance and produce better quality financial statements.  On the other 
hand, Low-Tier banks might deals with higher risks corporate customer, who might 
not be able to secured loans from bigger banks.  Thus, the loan officers have to 
investigate or acquire more information and would value active audit committee as a 
sign of low risk.  Statistical test documented a significant differences of perceptions 
( at 1% level), between the three groups of respondents (see Panel A and B of Table 
5).  This indicate the strength of their perceptions in the need for an active audit 
committee to safeguard auditor independence.
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The findings from the interviews were consistent with that of the questionnaire 
survey, that is the majority (53%) of the loan officers interviewed agreed with the 
statement that active audit committees would safeguard auditor independence. 
However, there was concern expressed not on the frequency but the quality of 
the meetings that can help improve good governance practices.  The interviews 
disclosed that audit committee should meet at least three times during a financial 
year, which conducted to correspond with important dates during a financial 
reporting such as reviewing quarterly financial statements.  The person to present 
during the meeting includes audit committee’s chairman and members of the 
committee.  In this context, the Bursa Malaysia has clearly specified in the Part C 
of Chapter 15 of the Listing requirement that “A listed issuer must ensure that other 
directors and employees attend any particular audit committee meeting only at the 
audit committee’s invitation, specific to the relevant meeting.” It was indicated 
that the meeting as an avenue for discussion about business transactions, debates 
among members and management on business issues and other matters arise.  The 
following are some extract of the interviews undertaken with the loan officers:
“The meeting frequency depends on the issues faced by the organisation 
where different organisations are facing different set of issues.  If 
there are many issues needed attention, they have to conduct more 
frequent meetings, otherwise they don’t need frequent meeting.  I think 
the meeting frequency doesn’t have relationship with audit committee 
effectiveness…Also, the regulatory agencies have to come out with a 
standard agenda and meeting guide that outline possible issues that 
need attention and clarification and the issue should be a common 
issues across the board.”
(Vice President, Top Tier Bank)
“…when audit committee meet; they meet for a reason, they meet to 
review the quarterly audit report or annual report.  So, what is important 
is not the frequency of meeting, it is the quality of the meeting.  You can 
even meet once a year, but if there is thorough and quality meeting, it 
is good enough.”
(Assistant General Manager, Low Tier Bank)
“…its boils down to the individual director that comes from various 
backgrounds.  Frequency of meeting does not ensure that they are 
effective; the most important is the content of the meeting.”
(Manager, Low Tier Bank)
“You have to look at how independent is the independent director, I 
think it is more important than the meeting frequency.  If they meet 
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every month, but the director is not independent, there is no point of 
having frequent meeting.”
(Chief Executive Officer, Low Tier Bank)
“…if we don’t tell audit committee members on certain issues, they 
wouldn’t know…whatever information that I give them is what I want 
them to see.  If I want to hide certain figures, I wouldn’t say they never 
find out, they can, they got to look at very detail. …to me, audit committee 
quality depend on their members quality…depends on how detail is their 
work.  I have seen some audit committee very superficial.”
(Chief Executive Officers, Top Tier Bank)
Compulsory Audit Committee reports
In an effort to highlight the existence of audit committee and their monitoring 
duties, the amended Bursa Malaysia listing requirements requires Malaysian 
public listed companies to prepare and disclose their report in the annual report. 
Audit committee report presents information about the committee efforts during 
the financial year such as meetings and oversight role.  A clear majority of the 
respondents in the Top (52%), Medium (52%) and Low (65%) Tier banks agreed 
with the view that auditor independence would be better safeguarded if audit 
committee reports were to be made compulsory in the annual report (refer Panel A 
of Table 5).  The responses might reflect their belief that the information presented 
in the reports could provide additional information to shareholders and the other 
stakeholders on activities undertaken by the committee during the financial year. 
Further analysis on the different perceptions between loan officers of different size 
of banks indicated no significant differences.
Majority (72%) of the loan officers interviewed believed that audit committees 
should present their reports as part of the company’s financial statement, which is 
consistent with the findings from the questionnaire survey.  The interviewees pointed 
out that audit committee report is an important document for stakeholders as they 
have very limited access to information on the committee activities and oversight 
efforts.  The general views are the existing requirements on audit committee report 
are too general and there is no review on such report by the regulators, which 
encourage the culture of ‘box ticking’ among Malaysian public listed companies. 
It was suggested that the respective regulator to come out with toolkit on possible 
content of audit committee report.  The toolkit should include open-ended questions 
relating to important issues that the members should discuss in their meetings 
such as risk areas, exceptional items, business risks, and threats arising from 
technology changes.  From the discussion, the committee should prepare their 
report accordingly.  The following are some extract of the interviews:
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“…Audit committee report represents as communication tool between 
the committee and the stakeholders.  Outsiders don’t have idea on our 
role to safeguard their interests.”
(Director, Medium Tier Bank)
“…currently, the content of the report is quite similar across companies 
and years…we don’t have idea on what should and should not be 
disclosed.  There is no clear guideline or sample of report.  We used the 
same style of reporting from year to year.  I believe regulators should 
come out with a guide for audit committee discussion, frequently asked 
questions and reporting guideline.” 
(Director, Low Tier Bank)
Approval and review of Audit Fees by Audit Committees
Generally, audit committee is perceived to present a strong corporate governance 
mechanism and could reduce the pressure faced by auditors in their communication 
with management.  Auditor might be influenced and pressured when management 
perform the role to approve and review audit fees.  Thus, the dilemma might 
be reduced if audit committees were to undertake the role of approving audit 
fees.  Panel A of Table 5 shows that 72%, 60% and 65% of the loan officers of 
Top, Medium and Low Tier banks respectively agreed with the view that auditor 
independence would be safeguarded if audit committees were to assume the role 
of approving audit fees.  The result indicates the loan officers’ confidence that an 
independent committee should have a hand in this important decision.  It is not 
the question of audit committee could be able minimising audit fees, but, the more 
important issue is that audit committee could encourage the ‘value for money’ audit 
fees.  When auditor is well paid, the job quality is expected to rise.
On the other hand, the majority of the loan officers (i.e. 72%, 68% and 68% of 
the Top, Medium and Low Tier banks respectively) as reported in Panel A of Table 
5 agreed with the view that auditor independence would be better safeguarded if 
audit committees were to assume the role of reviewing audit fees.  The respondents 
are of the view that a strong independent audit committee will provide better 
review of audit fees without any vested interest in financial reporting and auditing 
services.
Management influence over auditors would diminish if audit committees 
were to take on responsibility to review and approve audit fees.  It was found that 
more than half of the interviewees agreed that auditor independence would be 
strengthened if auditors were given the responsibility to approve audit fees.  The 
interviews disclosed that audit committees could play a critical role in the financial 
reporting process by acting as intermediaries, having the power to review and 
approve audit fees, and as a result, helping auditors to maintain their independence. 
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In delivering their duties appropriately, audit committees should ensure that audit 
hours are not discounted at the expense of audit quality.  The following are some 
extract of the interviews that reflects the above stated views:
“…the effectiveness of the audit committee in performing their role 
to review and approve audit fees very much depends on who are the 
directors, their ability to grasp a lot of technical issues…”
(Director, Medium Tier Bank)
“…some of this audit committee are just there for show, to comply with 
the requirement.”
(Senior Manager, Low Tier Bank)
“…when audit committee review and approve audit fees, the auditor 
should no longer fear of the possible threat from company’s management; 
fear of termination, fear of fees reduction, fear not be appointed in the 
following financial year.”
(Executive, Top Tier Bank)
Audit Committee Members
Among important factors that determine audit committee effectiveness is its 
composition (e.g. the independence).  The Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 
necessitate that the majority of audit committee members and its chairman composed 
of independent directors.  Audit committee is perceived by business community to 
monitor the integrity of financial statements and internal controls system.  Audit 
committees that comprise of solely independent (or outside) directors is perceived 
to be more effective to deliver their duties that possibly ask for greater depth and 
scope of internal audit activities and procedures.  The majority of the loan officers 
of Top (96%), Medium (92%) and Low (95%) Tier banks agreed with the view 
that auditor independence would be safeguarded if audit committees were mostly 
comprised of independent and non-executive directors (refer to Panel A of Table 
5).  The result indicates the expectation that an independent director should be 
independent of management interests and thus can deliver their duties as a director; 
(i) minimize agency costs or moral hazards through effectively and efficiently 
monitor the management, and (ii) enhance financial transparency.  In this context, 
Bursa Malaysia listing requirements defines an independent director “as a director 
who is independent of management and free from any business or other relationship 
which could interfere with the exercise of independent judgment or the ability to 
act in the best interests of an applicant or a listed issuer.”
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Consistent with the findings from the questionnaire survey, the majority of 
the interviewees (i.e. 94%) agreed that auditor independence would be better 
safeguarded if audit committees were mostly comprised of independent and non-
executive directors.  However, many of the interviewees have raised concern on the 
independence quality of members of audit committee as reflected in the following 
extracts of the interviews:
“How independent are they? To me it all boils down to individual…but 
I have seen the so-called independent directors not independent.”
(Chief Executive Officers, Top Tier Bank)
“…we have to look who nominate the independent director, which is 
normally the director.  I think this kind of appointment more or less will 
have an impact to the committee independence.”
(Vice President, Top Tier Bank)
“I’m a bit concerned, we talk about independent directors, how can 
they be independent? Say I’m appointed as independent director by Mr 
CEO, do you think I’m going to say something which is going to make 
him unhappy? I wouldn’t!”
(General Manager, Low Tier Bank)
Some of the interviewees come out with recommendations on selecting 
members of audit committee.  The following are an extract of the interviews 
relating to the suggestion:
“…To me if we need the real independent, audit committee members 
should be appointed by a body and that body have a list of persons 
that eligible to be an independent director and the body will appoint 
them.”
(Chief Executive Officer, Low Tier Bank)
“...the authority should be the selecting body...organisation can submit 
the various names, an independent selection body should pick this 
people…Once they have selected, if the organisation wants to terminate 
their services, they have to give various reasons to the authority…
Whatever the perks, whatever the benefits are totally decided by this 
independent body, so there are no compromise.
(Assistant General Manager, Low Tier Bank)
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The views expressed during the interviews on the importance of an independent 
audit committee to perform their duties objectively to evaluate company’s financial 
disclosure and internal control adequacy is consistent with findings of prior studies 
in developed markets.  For example, Beasley et al. (2000) and Abbott et al. (2003) 
show that companies that have majority independent audit committee members 
exhibit low fraud incidence, implying better quality financial reporting.
ConCLusIon
Issues on audit committee have been well researched and documented in the 
literature.  The issue of interest has direct impact on the quality of corporate 
governance practices.  Generally, investors perceive that strong market discipline 
protects their interest.  This market discipline creates incentives for companies 
to conduct their businesses in a sound and efficient manner.  In this study, the 
questionnaire and interview surveys of a category of stakeholders, the loan 
officers of major banks and financial institutions in Malaysia, agree that auditor 
independence would be better safeguarded by the presence of an active audit 
committee, the audit committee report detailing their activities should be mandatory 
in the annual report, the audit committee be made responsible for approving and 
reviewing audit fees, and audit committee members comprise of independent and 
non-executive directors.
Audit committee could significantly safeguard auditor independence if 
members are truly independent, knowledgeable and are committed to improve 
good governance without fear and favour.  The culture of ‘box ticking’ or ‘mere 
compliance’ as reflected by the responses in the interviews are a matter of great 
concern and requires immediate response from regulators.  There is an urgent need 
for the committee to go beyond procedural compliance, which address issues on 
good governance, internal control structure over financial reporting, internal audit 
issues and the role of the head of accounting and finance division with internal 
audit (monitoring) division.  In an effort to support and encourage audit committee 
to deliver their duties effectively, regulatory bodies need to develop a tool kit to 
guide the committee.  The tool kit should identify and, which among others, include 
explanation on internal control mechanisms, the relevant guiding information.
The result indicate the confidence of the respondents on the potential benefits 
from having well functioning and independent audit committees in facilitating 
communication network between auditors, management and related parties in 
preparing quality financial reports.  Majority of loan officers participated in 
the study appreciate the potential benefits from having a well functioning audit 
committee and its role in enhancing good corporate governance practices.  This 
implies positively on the efforts towards improving efficiency and transparency 
of financial reporting process, which is important consideration in attracting more 
foreign capital in our financial markets.
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